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THE VALUATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
FOR THE PURPOSE OF RATE MAKING
By E. J. Plunkett of the Denver Bar
PUBLIC UTILITY is defined as: An enterprise which
has dedicated its property to a public use, and supplies
a commodity or renders a service of a public necessity
to the public. The enterprise may be under public or private
ownership.
The valuation of a public utility for the purpose of rate
making is only one of the powers and duties of the governing
commission or board. However, the problem of valuation
is the chief and most persistent difficulty, encountered by
courts, commissions and the utilities, in the regulation of utilities. The power to regulate utilities is not a matter of contention. Ever since the Granger cases, particularly Munn
v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876), it has been conceded that
public utilities may be regulated under the police power of a
state.
The proper theory of the valuation of public utilities has
been an unending source of trouble to the Interstate Commerce
Commission, State Commissions, State and Federal Courts
and the United States Supreme Court.
It is thought by many of the lay public that the public
utilities and public service corporations in fixing rates strike
upon an arbitrary figure as the rate which is to be charged the
public for the commodity or service used. This is not the case.
Aside from the fact that public utilities sometimes contract
with a municipality as to the rate to be charged the public for a
commodity or service, the usual procedure is by the valuation
of the property of the public utility for the purpose of arriving at a fair and just rate, fair and just both to the public and
the utility. This procedure is comparatively recent and has
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developed since the decision in 1898 of Smyth v. Ames, 169
U. S. 466.
When a valuation is found it is denominated the rate
base. A public utility is justly entitled to earn on the monetary value of its property used and useful the same rate of
return that it would or could receive if the value of its
property, in money, were invested in good securities at the
market rate of return. Consequently, one of the first steps
to be taken in establishing a rate to be charged the public by
a public utility is to ascertain the fair value of the property
used and useful by the utility in supplying a commodity or
service at the time of the appraisal.
This article is to treat more the different theories of valuation and the disputatious differences between the different
theories rather than the elements and things that go to make
up the total final value or rate base arrived at under whatever
theory of valuation is used.
VALUATION THEORIES.

The theories or methods used in the valuation of public
utilities property are:
(a) Original cost, sometimes called Actual cost or Historical Cost.
(b) Cost of Reproduction or Replacement Cost.
(c) The Prudent Investment Theory. (proposed)
(d) Present Value.
Cost and value in public utility regulations are not synonymous. Advocates of original cost or original cost to date
contend that no greater "value" should be placed upon a plant
or system than it actually cost to date and that therefor the
"value" to be given a particular plant or system is its "cost".
To determine this cost under this theory recourse must be had
to the records or books of the company. It has invariably developed, in the earlier cases, that the records were lost or
the books were not properly kept, and were therefore of no
evidentiary value. Again no value is given to the unearned
increment, e. g. in real estate, or to franchise value, strategic
value, going value, good-will, or earning power. The real
estate may have been, as often was the case, in the first instance
a gift from the community to induce the establishment of a
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public utility in the community. This theory, for many reasons, was not satisfactory to the utilities. Nor were the courts,
in many instances, favorable to this theory. In Wilcox v.
Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, Judge Peckham said:
"And we concur with the court below in holding that the value of the
property is to be determined as of the time when the inquiry is made regarding
the rates. If the property which legally enters into the consideration of the
question of rates has increased in value since it was acquired, the company is
entitled to the benefit of such increase. This is, at any rate, the general rule."

In the Minnesota Rates Cases, Justice Hughes, now Chief
Justice, announced:
"It is clear that in ascertaining the present value we are not limited to
the consideration of the amount of the actual investment. If that has been
reckless or improvident, losses may be sustained which the community does
not underwrite. As the company may not be protected in its actual investment, if the value of its property be plainly less, so the making of a just return
for the use of the property involves the recognition of its fair value if it be
more than its cost."

Some more equitable rule to determine fair value had to
be evolved, and out of the dissatisfaction with the original cost
theory grew the Cost of Reproduction theory. Cost of reproduction while not amenable to strict definition may be somewhat defined as follows: That amount of money or estimated
investment which would be required to reproduce the same
or existing plant or system if the existing plant were nonexistent, but not to reproduce an equally effective plant.
In estimating the "cost of reproduction new" of an existing railroad, Vanderblue in Railroad Valuation depicts the
following mental picture:
"The road bed is assumed to disappear, and in place of the smoothed
and well-tended grade the conditions met at the time of construction are
restored. The right of way and terminal properties pass into private hands
to be devoted to the same use as adjoining tracts. The equipment vanishes,
the working force is scattered. The very corporate existence ceases. * * *
The population, rural and urban, does not desert the line of the road; busy
factories and warehouses stand at the edge of a primeval right of way, which
is overgrown with trees and underbrush. Everything awaits the advent of
the courageous promoter who shall place surveying parties in the field, secure
the charter, arrange financial matters: in short, set 6 ut to restore the plant
of the road which in imagination has been made to disappear, yet which in
fact exists. What will it cost?"
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The cost, arrived at under this theory, will be cost of reproduction new. But the cost of reproduction theory did not
fully meet the need and was subjected to as much criticism
as the original cost theory. Whitten in his work, Valuation
of Public Service Corporations, 2nd ed. Sec. 324, says:
"Cost of reproduction may mean the cost of a substitute plant of the
most modern, approved design capable of performing the same service as the
existing plant. If the old plant were wiped out, what would it cost at present
to construct a plant capable of performing the service now performed by the
old plant? In the case of a water plant, perhaps an entirely new source of
supply would be used and the distribution system radically changed; in the
case of a gas plant, a different process of production employed and a few
large gas holders substituted for many small ones; in the case of an electric
plant, larger units of production employed; in the case of a railroad, there
might be a radical relocation and realignment of roadbed, and important
changes in methods of construction. The present value of the old plant is
measured by the cost of an equally efficient new plant less an allowance for
the depreciated condition of the old plant. This seems to be the most logical
method of arriving at present structural value. One difficulty in applying it
arises from the fact that in many cases it is exceedingly difficult and expensive
to determine on an equally efficient substitute plant."

Further in this same work at page 646, it is said:
"The difficulties of the reproduction method were also discussed in
Fuhrmann v. Cataract Power and Conduit Company, * * * Chairman Stevens
said: 'This method of ascertaining the fair amount of the investment, although
it has been treated with favor, is also subject to severe criticism. This first
arises from the practical impossibility of ascertaining with any reasonable
degree of accuracy the cost of reproduction new. This impossibility has been
demonstrated in most attempts which are made.' "

Pond on Public Utilities, 3rd ed. Sec. 594, says:
"Reproduction less depreciation.-The adoption of the theory of reproduction is attended with practically all the difficulties of that of original cost,
and the application of either must be attended with a reduction of the amount
of the depreciation which the plant has sustained, except so far as its parts
may have been repaired or replaced; nor does the theory of the original cost
or the cost of reproduction take into account a valuation of the plant as a
going concern with an established income. This element of value is generally
accepted and is to be added to original or reproduction costs."

Of late years the Prudent Investment Theory has been
advanced by some authorities as the proper rule to use in
valuation cases. This theory is not in general use and is only
recommended. Justice Brandeis is an advocate of the pru-
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dent investment theory. However, the United States Supreme
Court is not of the same opinion as Justice Brandeis. Prudent
Investment means what it implies, i. e., investments made
prudently. It precludes the idea of giving value to investments made with poor or bad judgment, losses sustained
through poor management, excessive salaries and excessive
promotional and organization expenses. This feature of the
prudent investment theory, of course, is not objectionable to
the fair mind, but in the last analysis it is akin to original or
actual cost and differs from actual cost in that actual cost may
embody imprudent investments and expenditures. In the
Southwestern Bell Telephone case, 259 U. S. 318, Justice
Brandeis, in dissenting from the majority opinion, said:
"The adoption of the amount prudently invested as the rate base and
the amount of the capital charge as the measure of the rate of return would
give definiteness to these two factors involved in rate controversies which are
now shifting and treacherous, and which render the proceedings peculiarly
burdensome and largely futile. Such measures offer a basis for decision which
is certain and stable. The rate base would be ascertained as a fact, not
determined as matter of opinion. It would not fluctuate with the market
price of labor, or materials, or money. It would not change with hard times
or shifting populations. It would not be distorted by the fickle and varying
judgments of appraisers, commissions, or courts. It would, when once made
in respect to any utility, be fixed for all time, subject only to increases to
represent additions to plant, after allowance for the depreciation included
in the annual operating charges."

There is another suggested test to determine value. It is
Outstanding Capitalization. Some persons contend that the
value of a utility is to be measured by its outstanding capitalization. Advocates of this method advance the argument that
since the issuance of stocks and bonds of public utilities is
under the control of the regulating body that the rate of return
to the utility should have some relation to the outstanding securities. But when it is considered that it is the valuation of
the physical property of the utility that is sought and not its
nominal "paper" value it is clear that there may be a wide
discrepancy between actual present value of a company and
its outstanding capitalization.
Present value is the true and only test of the fair value
of a utility, be that present value arrived at by one or all of
the known theories. The United States Supreme Court in
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Smyth v. Ames, before the term "Present Value" was coined
used the phrase "the present as compared with the original
cost of construction."
Many proposed suggestions to determine fair value were
offered as the true test, such as the valuation for taxation,
valuation for condemnation proceedings and valuation for
bargain and sale or market value. For obvious reasons these
proposed methods met with failure. Tax laws differ widely.
Taxation may in part be based upon market value and earning power of a utility. The market value and earning power
of a utility is dependent upon the rate to be charged. It is,
therefore, folly to use taxation value to determine rates when
market value or earnings are not established until the rate is
established. The same is true of the condemnation theory.
Intangibles are valued in condemnation proceedings but not
all intangibles are valued in rate making proceedings. As to
the purchase and sale or market value theory, apart from
other objections, a very material objection is that it isn't every
day that a public utility has a ready and willing purchaser
or a quoted market value. Market value depends upon earnings, earnings depend upon rates, and rates are what are sought
to be established. It is vicious circle reasoning.
THE CASES.

Smyth v. Ames, supra, in valuation proceedings for rate
making is the landmark case, and though decided thirty-two
years ago is still contr6lling, notwithstanding that Justices
Holmes, Stone, and Brandeis do not agree with it. In it the
matters to be taken into consideration in valuation proceeding
for rate making are thus set out:
"In order to ascertain that value the original cost of construction, the
amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and markef value
of its bonds and stock, the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning capacity under particular rates prescribed by
statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters for
consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just and right in
each case. We do not say that there may not be other matters to be regarded
in estimating the value of the property. What the company is entitled to
ask is a fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the public
convenience. On the other hand, what the public is entitled to demand is
that no more be exacted from it for the use of a public highway than -the
services rendered by it are reasonably worth."
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Many authorities quarrel with this decision, but Justice
Hughes, in the Minnesota Rate Cases, Shepherd v. Simpson,
230 U. S. 352, adhered to its principles. Likewise did Justice
McReynolds, who wrote the majority opinion in the O'Fallon
case, St. Louis and O'Fallon Ry. Co. v. U. S., 42 S. Ct. 384,
(May 20, 1929), the opinion saying:
"The elements of value recognized by the law of the land for rate
making purposes have been pointed out many times by this Court. Smyth
v. Ames."

The O'Fallon case was a recapture case and not a rate making
case, but the elements of valuation are the same in recapture
cases as in rate making cases.
The decided cases follow Smyth v. Ames in general, with
some deviations dependent upon the facts of the cases. The
principal cases are Reagan v. Farmers, etc., 154 U. S. 362,
Knoxville v. Knoxville, etc., 212 U. S. 1, Minnesota Rate
Cases, supra, Southwestern Bell Tele. Co. v. Pub. Service,
etc., 262 U. S.276, Bluefield, etc., v. Pub. Service Com., 262
U. S.679, McCardle v. Ind., etc., 272 U. S.400.
Whenever a proposed valuation and rate is fixed by a
regulating commission or board, which is not satisfactory to
the utility or public service corporation, the utilities seek an
injunction setting up the allegation that the valuation and rate
discriminate, and are confiscatory and deprive the utility of
its property without due process of law under Articles V
and XIV of the Amendments to the United States Constitution or the similar provisions in state constitutions.
The utilities now advocate the cost of reproduction theory. William Jennings Bryan was counsel for the State of
Nebraska in Smyth v. Ames and in that case contended, and
most firmly, that the true test of the value of a railroad for rate
making purposes was the cost of reproduction. The railroads
then were contending that the only right basis of value for the
purpose of rate making was original cost. Were the case of
Smyth v. Ames to be reargued now by the same attorneys who
argued in 1898, they would simply trade theories and could,
with grace, exchange briefs, each contending for a change of
theory. Economic conditions and the changing value of the
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dollar are the real causes responsible for the differences of
opinion concerning valuation theories.
It would seem that some more satisfactory and quasi permanent method of determining fair value is desired by all concerned, not to forget the consumer and stock and bond holder.
Of late years the consumer of the commodity of a public
service company-public utility-is also in many instances a
holder of the company's stock or bond. If he as a consumer
demands a lower rate for the commodity he uses, he can only
expect to receive a decreased dividend on his security. If he
wishes a larger dividend on regular average earnings, he can
only expect to pay a higher rate for the commodity or service.
He is in a dilemma.
The State of New York has recently appointed a Special
Legislative Commission on the Revision of Public Service
Commission Law with the idea of formulating policies and
principles dealing with public utilities. To allow the public
utility, in valuation proceedings, a present fair value is beside
the point. The difficulty lies in the method or ways of arriving at the fair value. This commission is divided as to which
of two plans is the more feasible. The majority recommend
that the local State Commission contract with the utilities respecting their individual valuations for ten year periods,
thus crystallizing or "freezing" a definite valuation for ten
years, allowing, however, for value fluctuations according to
the swing of plrices of labor and materials and other factors
affecting values. The minority desire to- qstablish a permanent "frozen" valuation based on the theory of prudent investment. The minority plan is called the Bauer plan, Bauer
being the author of several works on public utility regulation.
Whether the rule laid down in Smyth v. Ames is correct
or not or whether it should be overruled remains to be seen.
Eminent jurists and writers contend the rule is obsolete and
does not meet the changed economic conditions. The criticism of Smyth v. Ames by Justice Brandeis has much merit.
His theory might, perhaps, establish a fixed method of valuation that would protect the rights of all concerned. He says
in the Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. case, supra, at page
308:
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"What is now termed the prudent investment is, in essence, the same
thing as that which the court has always sought to protect in using the term
present value. Twenty-five years ago, when Smyth v. Ames was decided,
it was impossible to ascertain with accuracy, in respect to most of the utilities,
in most of the states in which rate controversies arose, what it cost in money
to establish the utility; or the money cost with which the utility was established; or what income had been earned by it; or how the income had been
expended. It was, therefore, not feasible, then, to adopt, as the rate base,
the amount properly invested or, as the rate of fair return, the amount of
the capital charge. Now the situation is fundamentally different. These
amounts are, now, readily ascertainable in respect to a large, and rapidly
increasing, proportion of the utilities. The change in this respect is due to the
enlargement, meanwhile, of the powers and functions of state utility commissions. The issue of securities is now, and for many years has been, under
the control of commissions, in the leading states. Hence the amount of capital
raised (since the conferring of these powers) and its cost are definitely known,
through current supervision and prescribed accounts, supplemented by inspection of the commission's engineering force. Like knowledge concerning the
investment of that part of the capital raised and expended before these broad
functions were exercised by the utifity commissions has been secured, in many
cases, through investigations undertaken later in connection with the issue of
new securities or the regulation of rates. The amount and disposition of
current earnings of all the companies are also known. It is, therefore, feasible
now to adopt as the measure of a compensatory rate-the annual cost, or
charge, of the capital prudently invested in the utility. And hence it should
be done."

Until some better theory is evolved Smyth v. Ames is the
guiding beacon.
Referring again to the recent action taken by the State of
New York in appointing a Special Legislative Committee
for the purpose of formulating policies and principles dealing
with public utilities, Bauer, in Public Utilities Fortnightly,
April 3, 1930, has written an article discussing the Bauer plan
and the Prendergast plan. In a foot-note he says:
"Since the above was written, the Revision Commission has made its
report to the New York Legislature. There was a majority and minority
report. The latter adopted the Bauer plan and incorporated it in a proposed bill. The majority agreed that a fixed rate base and return are essential-to affective regulation, but instead of the mandatory provisions, it proposed to include the plan in contracts between the state and the companies;
it doubted whether a mandatory system could be enforced against a shift to
higher or lower prices. The minority believed that the contract plan would
not be accepted by the companies on a reasonable basis. While it admitted
that there may be a constitutional question as to the mandatory provisions
when prices have risen or fallen sharply, it believed the policy would be
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sustained because of its inherent reasonableness and because of its necessity
on administrative and financial grounds."

It will be interesting to read the act that will be passed, if
passed, growing out of the "proposed bill". Perhaps out of
this action by the State of New York may spring a nucleus
from which may emerge a solution of the vexing and at the
present time refractory theories of valuation.

COLERIDGE DIDN'T TELL IT ALL
"In Xanadu did Kubla Kahn
A stately pleasure dome decree,
Where Alph, the sacred river ran,
Through caverns measureless to man,
Down to the sunless sea."
He ran the place a month or two
And kept things going pretty free,
And then his creditors put him through
Involuntary bankruptcy.

J. H. DENISON.

